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Foreword 
 
MGYOSZ (the Federation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists) and ICEG European Center 
had their first joint conference in November 2005 in Brussels. It focused on the renewed Lisbon 
programme and especially its relevance to the new member states of the EU. 
Since the initiative proved to be a success, in June 2007, MGYOSZ and ICEG European Center 
organised their second common conference in Brussels. This time the conference was more 
specific about the Lisbon goals: presentations concentrated on growth developments and the 
creation of new jobs in the new member states and on the possible macroeconomic effects of the 
EU Structural and Cohesion funds. 
Following the introductory words of Pál Gáspár, the director of ICEG European Center, the first 
session of the conference went on to explore issues concerning growth performance and 
competitiveness. The three presenters in succession were: Frigyes-Ferdinand Heinz from the 
European Central Bank, Marc Stocker from BusinessEurope and Szabolcs Erdős from ICEG 
European Center. The issues for discussion in this panel were:  
? What are the medium-term driving factors of catching-up in the EU8+2?  
? Is growth driven by increasing productivity or factor inputs contribute more to growth than 
they did earlier?  
? What are the major challenges to achieve sustained convergence and increasing 
competitiveness? 
The second panel concentrated on employment and labour market challenges. The three speakers 
were: Béla Galgóczi from the European Trade Union Institute, Leszek Kasek from the World Bank 
and Gábor Pellényi from ICEG European Center. The issues for discussion of this session were: 
? Is the catching-up of the EU8+2 still characterised by “jobless growth”?  
? What are the reasons behind differences in employment rates and what can policies do to 
increase labour market flexibility in the EU8+2?  
? What are the experiences of policy makers with labour market reforms in the EU8+2? 
The third session was devoted to issues concerning the use of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds. 
Christoph Rosenberg from the Warsaw regional office of IMF, John Walsh from the Directorate 
General Regional Policy of the European Commission and András Oszlay from ICEG European 
Center presented their views and findings in this session. Discussion was mostly focusing on: 
? What are the lessons concerning the allocation of Structural Funds learnt by other net 
recipients?  
? What have been the experiences of the EU8 in 2004-2006?  
? How should the EU8+2 allocate the use of funds to promote long-term growth and 
employment objectives?  
? Do National Development Plans reflect the needed efficient allocation of resources? 
Of the nine presentations, five was elaborated on by their respective authors in this „Conference 
Proceedings”. The first article is that of Christoph Rosenberg (co-authored by Robert Sierhej), 
which gives an overview of the effects of the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds ont he 
macroeconomic variables in Central and Eastern Europe. The second article is from András 
Oszlay, who surveyed the quantitative analyses concerning the use of these funds and the 
resulting effects on the most important macroeconomic indicators. The third article is written by 
Szabolcs Erdős, who assessed the growth performance of the new member states in light of the 
Lisbon targets. In the fourth article Béla Galgóczi gives his contribution to the understanding of why 
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labour had such minor contribution to growth in the new member states in the past decade. Finally, 
Gábor Pellényi’s article goes on to briefly examine the factors that influenced activity and 
employment rates in the new member states. 
For further information on past and future MGYOSZ – ICEG EC joint conferences you are advised 
to visit the website of ICEG European Center at http://www.icegec.hu.   
 
 
 
The conference venue was „Room Europe”  
in the headquarters of BusinessEurope 
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Interpreting  EU  funds  data  for  macroeconomic  analysis  in  the  new 
member states1 
 
- Christoph B. Rosenberg and Robert Sierhej (International Monetary Fund) - 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Transfers from the EU are increasingly impacting the economies of the EU’s new member 
states in Central and Eastern Europe (NMS).2 Widely perceived in the region as “manna from 
heaven”, much attention is currently focused on how to absorb these funds as quickly as possible, so 
as not to lose them under EU rules. At the same time, injecting up to 4 percent of GDP into 
economies that are already in a rapid catch-up process will have significant macroeconomic 
ramifications. Little analysis of these effects in the specific context of the NMS has been carried so 
far, because of uncertainties about the flows involved, the limited empirical evidence to date and the 
sometimes complex rules regarding the usage of EU funds. Data available from national and EU 
sources are, prima facie, not useful for macroeconomic analysis because of differences in 
accounting conventions and categorization.  
This paper is intended as a primer on the macroeconomic implications of EU funds in the 
NMS. It focuses on EU-related financial flows from and to the NMS, during the first 2 ½ years of 
membership as well as under the EU’s new financial perspective (NFP) for 2007-13. This 
information is not readily available and depends crucially on each country’s projected absorption 
path. The paper seeks to create a correspondence between the forms in which EU funds data are 
conventionally presented and the categories necessary to assess their impact on fiscal and external 
accounts and aggregate demand. It also provides some preliminary back-of-the-envelope estimates 
of the expected magnitudes. The paper is not intended to offer a full macroeconomic analysis, in 
particular the implications for growth, employment and the real exchange rate. This more ambitious 
task, which would require a model-based approach, is left to another paper. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II gives an overview of the size and structure of EU 
funds available to the NMS. Section III focuses on structural funds, which are the bulk of funds 
under the NFP. Section IV looks at the fiscal implications. Section V provides estimates of 
projected actual – as opposed to committed – flows, which are necessary to assess the first-round 
impact of EU funds on aggregate demand and the balance of payment. Section VI concludes.    
II. EU FUNDS AVAILABLE TO THE NMS: AN OVERVIEW 
EU funds to the NMS serve three broad purposes: income convergence, agricultural support 
and development of internal market institutions. This is achieved by a myriad of individual 
programs, each with their own set of rules and target institutions. Moreover, the classification of 
these funds has changed under the NFP, making it sometimes difficult to compare commitments 
                                                 
1 This article was kindly provided for re-publication in this Conference Proceedings by Christoph B. Rosenberg, one of the authors. 
Its only deviation from the original publication (IMF Working Paper 07/77) is that Appendix 2 is removed. 
2 The NMS covered in this paper include Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
(EU8), plus Bulgaria and Romania. The latter two are only included with respect to the new financial perspective 2007-13 as data on 
pre-accession aid in 2004-06 were not available. 
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before and after 2007. Box 1 provides a mapping of the EU’s budget headings from old to new 
financial perspective. An explanation of the various programs is contained in Appendix I. 
Box 1. Classification of EU funds available to NMS 1/
New Budget headings 2007-13 Old Budget headings 2004-06
Preservation and management of natural resources Agriculture
Market measures Market measures
Direct payments Direct payments
Rural development Rural development
     EAFRD--EU Agricultural Rural Development Fund
 EAGGF--EU Agricultural Guarantee and 
Guidance Fund (guararantee section)
     FIFG--EU Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Sustainable growth Structural actions 
Competitiveness for growth and employment
Nuclear safety
Community initiatives      Community initiatives
Cohesion for growth and employment
Structural funds Structural funds
     ESF--EU Social Fund      ESF--EU Social Fund
     ERDF--EU Fund for Regional Development      ERDF--EU Fund for Regional Development
EAGGF--EU Agricultural Guarantee and 
Guidance Fund (guidance section )
     FIFG--EU Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Cohesion Funds Cohesion Funds
Citizenship, freedom, security and justice Internal Policies
Existing policies Existing policies
Schengen Nuclear safety
Institutional building 
Schengen
EU as a global player Pre-accession
    Pre-accession
Compensations Compensations
     Budget compensation      Budget compensation
1/ Headings which do not affect transfers to NMS (e.g., administration) are omitted.
 
Overall funds committed to the NMS are set to increase under the EU’s new financial 
perspective (Figure 1a). In nominal terms, all NMS are promised substantially greater allocations 
under the NFP than what they were granted for 2004-06 (the so-called Copenhagen agreement) and 
before membership (pre-accession aid). Poland, for example, will replace Spain as the largest 
recipient of EU structural funds. In GDP terms, increases are not quite so impressive (Figure 1b), 
reflecting high projected nominal GDP growth in the NMS3. Indeed, EU funds are likely to decline 
as a percentage of GDP in fast-growing countries like Latvia. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Hungary and Czech Republic are set to enjoy a steep increase in EU funds relative to GDP, in part 
due lower medium-term growth assumptions. Differences in country-specific allocations primarily 
reflect the degree of real income convergence (Figure 2) 
                                                 
3 GDP projections used in this paper draw on real growth and US Dollar deflators from the latest IMF country reports. The US 
Dollar/Euro exchange rate is assumed to remain at its present level. 
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Fig 1a. NMS: Average annual commitments (in euro bn, 2004 prices) 
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Fig 1b. NMS: Average annual commitments (in percent of GDP, current prices) 
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Source: National authorities, European Commission, IMF staff estimates. 
* Data on pre-accession aid are not available. 
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Fig 2. NMS: Commitments and real convergence 
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Source: National authorities, European Commission, Eurostat, IMF staff estimates. 
 
Funding is increasingly focused on speeding up income convergence (Figure 3). Structural and 
cohesion funds are intended to foster real convergence and therefore account for a large share of 
payments in the less wealthy NMS. They are set to increase substantially under the NFP, mainly at 
the expense of unconditional lump sum budget payments granted in the first years of membership 
primarily to richer countries such as Slovenia (at the time intended to prevent them from becoming 
net payers to the EU). The NMS will also experience a gradual increase in direct payments to 
farmers under the common agricultural policy: starting from 40 percent of the level in old members 
states in 2007, payments to farmers will be increased by 10 percentage points a year to reach parity 
with the old members by 2013.  
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Fig 3. NMS: Structure of commitments 
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Source: National authorities, EC. 
1/ Include structural funds (ERDF, ESF, community initiatives) and cohesion funds 
2/ Includes direct payments, market measures, and rural development (FIFG/EFF and EAGGF (guidance & 
guarantee)/EAFRD) 
 
 
As EU members, the NMS also contribute about one percent of GDP to the EU budget. These 
contributions (called own resources) include gross national product based resources, value added 
tax based resources, the British rebate4, and the EU’s traditional revenue sources collected on its 
behalf by national governments (sugar levies and 75 percent of tariffs on non-EU imports) and are 
presently capped at 1.24 percent of gross national income. In fact, the NMS’ annual payments have 
been around one percent of GDP in 2005 and 2006 (the first full years of membership) and are 
expected to remain at that level, also in the recent accession countries Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The rebate is calculated as 66 percent of its theoretical negative balance towards the EU budget (around Euro 5.3 billion in 2007). It 
is financed by all other EU members according to their GNI shares (those for Austria, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden are 
reduced by three quarters). 
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STRUCTURAL FUNDS 
Structural and cohesion funds, the EU’s main instrument to increase country’s growth 
potential, are attracting great attention in the NMS. These funds finance investment in physical 
infrastructure and human resource development (rather than income support) and are therefore 
designed to permanently increase countries’ productive potential and speed up real convergence. 
The committed amounts are 
large—ranging from an 
annual average of 1 ½ percent 
of GDP in Slovenia to over 3 
percent of GDP in Hungary—
and expectations regarding 
their positive effects are 
correspondingly high. 
Discussions with the 
European Commission have 
so far focused on National 
Strategic Reference 
Frameworks which define 
NMS’ priorities regarding the 
use of these funds. These 
differ substantially (Figure 4), 
with larger countries like 
Poland allocating a big 
portion to regional programs 
while others (especially the 
Baltics) dedicating larger 
share to human resource 
development. These plans are 
expected to be finalized in 
2007. 
   
 
Absorption of structural funds picked up only slowly in some countries, pointing to teething 
problems. There is a concern in some NMS that funds could be de-committed if they are not drawn 
within the timeframe set by the EU. Data now available for the first 2 ½ years of membership allow 
some analysis of the pace and problems of absorption. Demand is high and contracting of funds 
committed under the 2004-06 financial perspective is proceeding swiftly. In most countries, it is 
likely to be completed by the end of 2006. Slovenia is contracting above EU commitments to ensure 
utilization of all funds in the event that implementation of some projects slips (Figure 5a). The 
bottleneck, however, is the absorption of EU funds: the administrative capacity to control projects, 
ensure efficient implementation, provide co-financing, and receive EU refunds after submission of 
proper documentation. Figure 5b shows that actual absorption, as measured by the submission of 
requests for interim payments, differs greatly between countries. The Czech Republic and Poland 
and the Czech Republic initially did very poorly – possibly because a large portion of funds is 
distributed to regional programs (Figure 4) - but have recently caught up with the other EU8. 
Slovenia, Estonia and Hungary, are doing particularly well. 
 
 
Fig 4. NMS: Allocations of EU structural funds 2007-2013 
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Fig 5a. EU8: Contracting of structural 
funds (end of December 2006, percent of 
2004-06 commitments) 
Fig 5b. EU8: Requests for interim 
payments (end of December 2006,percent 
of 2004-06 commitments) 
 
 
Absorbing all structural funds presents an increasingly tall order. Under the so-called n+2 rule, 
countries need to submit all claims for refunds by end-2008, necessitating an acceleration of past 
absorption rates if funds are not to be de-committed. The challenge is compounded by the increased 
allocation under the NFP. An extension of the time permitted between contracting and 
reimbursement from 2 to 3 years will help, at least until 2011 when the n+3 rule reverts to the 
present n+2 rule. Figure 6 illustrates this absorption challenge by plotting a trend line of absorption 
to date (based on 2004-06 actuals) against the cumulative amounts that need to be absorbed so as 
not to lose funds under the n+2/n+3 rule. Estonia is well on track to meeting this challenge while 
other countries, especially the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovakia and Poland need to sharply 
accelerate their absorption over the next two years if they are not to lose funds. 
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Fig 6. EU8: Structural funds--EU commitments and country-specific absorption 1/
(cumulative in Euro billion)
Source: European Commission, national authorities, IMF staff calculation.
1/ Trend extrapolation based on drawings in 2004-06.
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Institutional frameworks for managing EU funds can affect the absorption capacity. General 
requirements are defined by EU regulations, but countries are free to find their own solutions within 
this framework. To date, one can identify two distinct models among the NMS:  
? The Baltic countries centered the management around the Finance Ministry which acts both 
as paying and managing authority. 
? Frameworks in the Central European countries are less centralized, with managing and 
paying authorities assigned to separate institutions (paying authority is always in the 
Ministry of Finance).  
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Performance so far provides no conclusive answer on which framework is more efficient. 
After all, the initial leaders in absorption, Slovenia and Estonia, represent both models. However, 
there appear to be two general lessons from the NMS’ experience: First, initial frameworks were 
over-regulated, often to prevent misuse of EU funds. Secondly, absorption is helped by a strong 
central managing authority. Countries have already reacted to this initial experience. For example, 
Poland in late 2005 created a new ministry of regional development to consolidate the oversight 
over funds which had previously been located in various ministries and this has greatly speeded up 
absorption. The Czech Republic, meanwhile, is retaining its disaggregated approach to managing 
EU funds. 
 
III. FISCAL IMPLICATIONS 
EU-related transfers directly impact countries’ fiscal balance. This matters, for two reasons: 
First, many NMS are struggling to exit from the excessive deficit procedure and aim to meet the 
Maastricht fiscal criteria for Euro adoption. It is therefore important to identify additional budgetary 
pressures arising from EU funds5. Secondly, EU funds obscure the size and direction of the fiscal 
stimulus. With data for at least two budget years available, it is now possible to undertake a first ex-
post assessment.  
Measuring the impact of EU funds on the fiscal accounts is fraught with a number of 
methodological difficulties. Several problems arise: 
Accounting method: The treatment of EU funds differs greatly between countries, mainly because 
they do not use the accrual-based ESA95 standard in their national budgets but rather stick to 
cash-based accounting (Box 2). But it is of course the deficit calculated according to ESA95 
rules that ultimately matters for determining a country’s compliance with the EU’s deficit limits.  
Ultimate user of funds: Under ESA95 rules, only funds that end up with “government units as final 
beneficiaries” are recorded as an expenditure and offsetting revenue item in the fiscal accounts 
(Box 2). In practice, funds for agricultural support virtually all go to the private sector, while 
those for internal policies and cohesion go to the public sector. The status of the ultimate user is 
the most uncertain for structural funds, even on an ex post basis (these data are generally not 
easily available): information obtained from some countries suggest that 45 percent of regional 
development funds (ERDF), 70 percent of social funds (ESF) and 100 percent of community 
initiative funds end up in the public sector.  
Co-financing: Under EU rules, countries need to co-finance every project from national resources, 
at rates ranging from 15 percent for cohesion funds to 25-50 percent for structural funds6. For 
structural funds committed under the NFP, this ratio has been reduced to 15 percent. In practice, 
the co-financing amount may be larger, depending on national policy preferences. Co-financing 
can also in principle come from the private sector (such as commercial loans) but for the time 
being, it overwhelmingly relies on budgetary resources. 
Substituted spending: Member countries are allowed to use EU-funds to substitute national 
spending for some purposes (e.g., agriculture), but not for others (e.g., structural)—the so-called 
                                                 
5 Prior to EU accession there was a lively debate about whether EU funds increase the make fiscal adjustment more difficult. See 
Hallet and Keerman (2005) and Sommer (2003). 
6 For structural funds, the co-financing requirement is 25 percent for Objective 1 projects (20 percent if the region in a country 
eligible for cohesion funds) and 50 percent for Objective 2 and 3 projects. Objectives 1-3 are defined in Appendix I. 
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additionality rules7. In practice it is virtually impossible to establish how much a government 
would have spent on a certain expenditure item if it had not had access to EU funds. Estimates 
of the fiscal impact of EU funds however, crucially hinge on getting the amount of additionality 
right. A simplified assumption, used in the paper, is that countries substitute domestic spending 
to the maximum extent possible under EU rules.  
 
Box 2. Accrual (ESA95) and cash-based fiscal reporting for EU funds 
 
  
ESA95 
 
 
Cash-statistics 
 
Coverage 
 
Only transfers to government beneficiaries 
are included in general government 
accounts. If transfers to non-government 
beneficiaries are intermediated by 
government agencies, they are reported 
below-the-line. 
 
Most NMS include all EU transfers above-the-
line regardless of the ownership of the final 
beneficiaries. Poland and Czech Republic, 
included only transfers to government 
beneficiaries initially, but changed this to 
include also transfers to non-government 
beneficiaries in the government accounts. 
 
 
EU-financed part of 
projects 
 
Expenditures and revenues are booked 
simultaneously, even if spending is 
financed by government borrowing and 
refunded by the EU with a delay. Thus, EU 
transfers for project financing are deficit 
neutral as expenditures have an automatic 
revenue counterpart. 
 
Expenditures and revenues are booked when 
they are incurred. This is not deficit neutral in 
the short-run due to time lags between 
expenditures and corresponding refunds. In the 
longer-run, the fiscal impact should be neutral 
to the extent that expenditures are fully 
refunded by the EU. 
 
 
National co-financing 
of EU supported 
projects 
 
Co-financing, required for most EU 
projects, is booked as expenditure. Other 
things equal (e.g., no decline in other 
expenses), this deteriorates fiscal balance. 
 
The same treatment as in ESA95; the usual 
cash/accrual discrepancies related to different 
timing of commitments and cash spending may 
apply. 
 
 
Budget compensation 
received from the EU 
 
This form of transfer from the EU is 
booked as budget revenue when it is 
received. Ceteris paribus, it improves fiscal 
balance.  
 
The same treatment as in ESA95. 
 
Contributions to the 
EU budget 
 
Payments to the EU are recorded at the 
time of their transfer, implying a negative 
impact on the fiscal balance. Traditional 
Own Resources (TOR), custom duties on 
non-EU imports and sugar levies, are not 
counted as a contribution because they are 
treated as the EU’s budget direct revenue 
rather than a transfer from member states.  
 
 
Booked as expenditure when transferred to the 
EU and thus deteriorates fiscal balance. Except 
for Hungary, NMS include TOR in their 
contributions to the EU. 
 
 
Advances for EU  
funds 
 
Advances are a part of structural 
commitments that is paid upfront to provide 
liquidity for starting EU-supported projects 
(advances are not related to project 
implementation). They are an off-budget 
item and have no fiscal impact. 
 
 
Baltic states NMS book advances as revenues 
which temporarily improves the fiscal balance. 
CEE countries book advances off-budget. 
 
 
An example for Lithuania illustrates the issues discussed above. It assumes that there is no expenditure 
substitution, agricultural funds are fully transferred to non-government beneficiaries, and other transfers end up 
with non-government entities. 
 
        Source: Data from the authorities and staff estimates. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The EU determines additionality by comparing spending in a certain category (including co-financing) with average spending in 
this category in the preceding two years. 
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Lithuania: Cash and accrual fiscal accounting for EU funds (percent of GDP)  
  Cash-based Accrual (ESA95) 
  2004 2005 2006p 2004 2005 2006p 
EU related revenues 2.2 2.8 3.2 0.9 1.0 1.4 
   Budget compensation 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
   Agriculture 0.3 1.3 1.6 … … … 
   EU refundable transfers 1.7 1.5 1.5 0.7 0.9 1.4 
     o/w advances 0.5 0.3 … … … … 
EU related spending 1.7 3.6 4.3 1.3 2.0 2.4 
   Contributions to EU 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 
   Agriculture 0.1 1.4 1.5 … … … 
   EU refundable transfers 1.0 1.2 1.8 0.7 0.9 1.4 
Domestic co-financing  0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.6 
          
Net fiscal impact  0.2 -1.3 -1.8 -0.7 -1.5 -1.6 
 
The net impact of EU-related transfer on the 
fiscal balance is negative in all countries. 
Using ESA95 accounting, the effect can be 
estimated by adding unconditional budget 
transfers received from the EU and substituted 
spending, and subtracting contributions to the  
EU and budgetary co-financing of projects8; EU 
funds that are passed on to government 
beneficiaries cancel each other out on the 
revenue and spending side (Text Table 1). As 
shown in Figure 7, EU-related transfers are—all 
other things being equal—increasingly creating a drag on fiscal deficits. The exact size depends 
mainly on the assumed amount of substituted spending, but could be in the range of ½ and 1 ½ 
percent of GDP.  
                                                 
8 There is a question if a part of co-financing should be treated as substituted spending on the assumption that this spending would 
have occurred if no EU funds had been available.  
Te xt Table  1. Frame work for e valuating dire ct fis cal 
impact of EU trans fe rs .
(1 ) E U  re late d re ce ipts  
budget compensation
  re funds on EU  projects/polic ies 1/
(2 ) E U  re late d e xpe nditure s  
  contribution to EU
  spending on EU  projec ts/polic ies 1/
  na tional co-financing
(3 ) Subs titute d s pe nding  2 /
N e t fis cal impact (1 )-(2 )+ (3 )
1 / Th ese l in es a re eq u a l in  ES A9 5 .
2 / In clu d in g  th e su b sti tu tio n  co mp o n en t o f co fin a n cin g .
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Fig 7. EU8: Net impact of EU-related funds on the fiscal deficit* 
(ESA95, percent of GDP) 
 
Source: National authorities, Eurostat, IMF staff estimates. 
* Substitution as reported by the authorities for HU and SI; maximum possible substitution 
according to EU rules for other countries. 
 
  
EU funds also obscure the size and direction of the fiscal stimulus. With both budgetary 
revenues and expenditures containing substantial transactions with a non-domestic entity (the 
European Commission), the change in the headline fiscal deficit from one year to the other is no 
longer a good approximation of the demand impact of fiscal policy. As shown in Text Table 2, 
payments to and from the EU need to be excluded from both expenditures and revenues. Since net 
transfers from the EU are increasing in all countries, this generally leads to larger estimates of the 
fiscal stimulus (or less withdrawal of stimulus) than suggested by the headline balances. 
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Text Table 2. Fiscal Stimulus due to EU-related transfers in the NMS
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenue 41.6 41.1 40.2 39.8 35.5 38.3 37.8 36.9
o/w EU funds 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.9 1.6 1.5 1.7
Expenditure 44.7 45.9 44 43.1 33.2 35.6 36.5 35.5
o/w contribution 1/ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Balance -3.1 -4.8 -3.8 -3.3 2.3 2.7 1.3 1.4
Adjusted revenue 41.1 40.6 39.6 38.7 34.6 36.7 36.3 35.2
Adjusted expenditure 43.7 44.9 43.0 42.1 32.2 34.6 35.5 34.5
Adjusted balance -2.5 -4.3 -3.4 -3.4 2.3 2.1 0.8 0.7
Fiscal stimulus:
    headline 1.7 -1.0 -0.5 -0.4 1.4 -0.1
    adjusted for EU funds 1.8 -1.0 0.0 0.3 1.2 0.1
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenue 33 33.3 33.9 34.5 40.9 41.8 42.4 41.6
o/w EU funds 1.4 1.3 1.9 2.5 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.7
Expenditure 33.6 34.5 34.8 35 43.3 43.7 43.8 42.6
o/w contribution 1/ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Balance -0.6 -1.2 -0.9 -0.5 -2.4 -1.9 -1.4 -1
Adjusted revenue 31.6 32.0 32.0 32.0 40.3 41.1 41.3 39.9
Adjusted expenditure 32.6 33.5 33.8 34.0 42.3 42.7 42.8 41.6
Adjusted balance -1.0 -1.5 -1.8 -2.0 -2.1 -1.6 -1.5 -1.7
Fiscal stimulus:
    headline 0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4
    adjusted for EU funds 0.5 0.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.2
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenue 42.2 41.9 43.1 43 35.3 36.1 37.4 37.4
o/w EU funds 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.4 1.3 2.0 1.8 1.8
Expenditure 50 52 49.9 47.2 36.8 37.5 38.8 38.7
o/w contribution 1/ 0.8 1/ 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
Balance -7.8 -10.1 -6.8 -4.2 -1.5 -1.4 -1.4 -1.3
Adjusted revenue 41.7 41.3 42.3 41.6 34.0 34.1 35.6 35.6
Adjusted expenditure 49.2 51.0 48.9 46.2 36.0 36.5 37.8 37.7
Adjusted balance -7.4 -9.7 -6.6 -4.6 -2.0 -2.4 -2.2 -2.1
Fiscal stimulus:
    headline 2.3 -3.3 -2.6 -0.1 0 -0.1
    adjusted for EU funds 2.3 -3.2 -1.9 0.4 -0.1 -0.1
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenue 36 34.2 33.4 32.7 45.8 45.1 43.6 42.7
o/w EU funds 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8
Expenditure 39.2 37.9 36.3 35.2 47.2 46.6 45.1 44.4
o/w contribution 1/ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Balance -3.2 -3.7 -2.9 -2.5 -1.4 -1.5 -1.5 -1.7
Adjusted revenue 35.4 33.4 32.4 31.0 45.0 44.3 43.0 41.9
Adjusted expenditure 38.2 36.9 35.3 34.2 46.2 45.6 44.1 43.4
Adjusted balance -2.8 -3.5 -2.9 -3.2 -1.1 -1.3 -1.1 -1.5
Fiscal stimulus:
    headline 0.5 -0.8 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2
    adjusted for EU funds 0.7 -0.5 0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.4
"+" = additional stimulus
"-"= withdrawal of stimulus
Source: National authorities, Convergence programs, IMF staff estimates.
1/ Excluding TOR.
2/Estimated distribution between government and non-government institutions may not exactly correspond to 
ESA actuals.
Slovakia 2/ Slovenia
Czech Republic Estonia 2/
Hungary Latvia 2/
Lithuania 2/ Poland 2/
 
 
The challenge is to make best use of EU funds without complicating fiscal policy. EU funds 
provide a unique opportunity to increase investment spending and thus to accelerate growth. But, as 
shown above, they will ceteris paribus contribute to larger deficits—a challenge especially for 
countries trying to meet the Maastricht fiscal criteria. Even in countries with low deficits or a 
surplus, EU funds may lead to an unwarranted fiscal stimulus. This is an issue primarily in the 
Baltics, where economies are already showing signs of overheating. 
What can be done to contain the fiscal drag? If countries do not want to permit fiscal loosening, 
they can use EU-funds to substitute domestic spending to the extent possible under EU rules. Co-
financing would need to be accommodated by reducing spending elsewhere, preferably in current 
expenditures which are still high in the NMS compared to other emerging market countries. This 
boils down to a relative increase of capital spending in the budget—after all, the purpose of 
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structural funds. Data for 2003-05 provide little evidence that countries have indeed reduced the 
share of current spending in order to make room for EU structural funds9.  
IV. BROADER MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
The broader macroeconomic implications of EU-related transfers depend on actual flows to 
the economy as a whole. The analysis needs to consider all funds involved (not only those passing 
through the budget discussed above) as well as countries’ contributions to the EU. As discussed in 
the section III, actual flows will depend on countries’ absorption rates and, to a lesser extent, market 
variables that influence certain receipts from the EU (e.g., agricultural support) and contributions to 
the EU (e.g., VAT share). Data for the first two years of EU membership suggest that all NMS 
were, as expected, net beneficiaries of 
EU funds, all be it to very different 
degrees (Figure 8). The Baltic 
countries received much larger 
amounts as percent of GDP than their 
Central European neighbours 
(between 1 and 2 percent, as opposed 
to about ½ percent) reflecting 
relatively large allocations received in 
the Copenhagen agreement and, at 
least in Estonia, early progress in 
establishing effective institutions to 
manage absorption. Net transfers from 
the EU are projected to increase to 
above 2 percent of GDP per year 
under the NFP for all NMS except 
Slovenia. At about 3 ½ percent of 
GDP, average annual inflows in 
Romania and Bulgaria are projected to 
be particularly high, reflecting 
generous allocations under the NFP 
and only slightly lower expected 
absorption rates than in the other 
NMS10. 
 
Aggregate Demand 
A number of conceptual issues arise when estimating the overall demand impact. Since net 
drawings from the EU were positive, it is natural to expect that they had a positive demand impact, 
even if limited in some countries. Measuring this impact is, however, not a straightforward task. 
Issues that need to be taken into account include: 
 
                                                 
9 National top-ups of EU agricultural transfers may be contributing to the persistently high share of current spending.  
10 Absorption in Bulgaria and Romania is optimistically projected at 95 percent of committed amounts, compared to around 98 
percent in the other NMS (in line with the better performing old member states at this stage). Note that in Romania and Bulgaria a 
larger part of funds is available as direct budgetary support which can be absorbed very quickly.  
Fig 8. NMS Net inflows of EU funds  
(percent of GDP, current prices) 
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Source: National authorities, European Commission, Eurostat, 
IMF staff estimates. 
*Data on preaccession aid are not available. 
  
  
  
 
18
? Advance payments bear no relation with economic activity and need to be excluded from 
any demand-side estimate. Given the infant stage of project preparation, these monies 
remained largely unspent in 2004 and rested on government accounts. Poland stands out as 
it initially used most of these advances to finance its state budget deficit. Only in 2005 were 
advances used at a larger scale to make payments to the beneficiaries of structural funds.  
? There are other timing issues: EU refunds are only received after documentation has been 
submitted to and approved by the European Commission (a process which may require up to 
six months), so they reflect economic activity from the past. It would therefore be more 
accurate to capture the demand impact at the time when beneficiaries sign contracts with 
suppliers or pay their bills rather than when EU refunds are received. But such data are 
difficult to obtain. 
? As discussed above, it is unclear whether EU funds are crowding out or augmenting 
domestic spending. Structural funds have an explicit additionality rule, but it is not easy to 
verify in practice. 
? Finally, there are second-round or Keynesian multiplier effects as well as general 
equilibrium implications that can only be captured in a broader model setting.  
As a first cut, the demand effect of EU-related transfers can be estimated in a simplified 
framework. Such a back-of-the envelope approach entirely disregards the timing and second-round 
effects issues mentioned above. The demand impact can be defined as: 
 
ACNCTD −−+= )(α  with >∈< 1,0α  
 
Where demand (D) depends on transfers from the EU (T), national co-financing (NC), contributions 
paid (C), and advances received (A). One of the greatest uncertainties is the degree in which EU 
funds substitute domestic spending that would have taken place anyway. We capture this by a 
crowding-out factor (α), a measure of substitution between EU transfers and domestic spending 
(α=1 if there is no substitution). 
The demand effect of EU-related transfers is mostly positive, but the results depend crucially 
on how much domestic spending is substituted. Figure 9a shows the results of the above formula 
if one makes the (admittedly heroic) assumption that all NMS followed official additionally 
guidelines on EU transfers, i.e., expenditures financed with structural, pre-accession, and rural 
development funds do not replace domestic spending while other EU transfers (e.g., cohesion, 
common agriculture policy, Schengen) do. Reflecting the different types of EU funds received, the 
implied values for α range from 0.55 in Hungary to 0.65 in Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia. In the first 
2 ½ years of EU membership, the demand impact is estimated to be rather modest (less than ½ 
percent GDP) in Central Europe, but higher (up to 1 percent of GDP) in the Baltics where EU 
commitments and (in Estonia) absorption have been high. In the time period covered by the NFP, 
the demand impact will be larger in most countries (especially in Hungary), as net EU-related 
inflows are projected to increase. The demand impact is estimated to be particularly large in 
Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria. For illustration, Figure 9b shows the demand effect if all EU 
funds are assumed to be additional to domestically-funded spending (α=1). The effects are now 
much larger, up to 4 percent of GDP under the NFP. 
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Fig 9. First-round demand effect of EU funds 
 
9a. Official additionality (α =0.55-0.65) 
(percent of GDP, current prices) 
9b. Full additionality (α =1)  
(percent of GDP, current prices) 
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Source: National authorities, European Commission, Eurostat, IMF staff estimates. 
*Data on pre-accession funds are not available. 
 
As the demand impact of EU funds grows, economic policy may need to adjust. In countries 
where growth is sluggish, EU funds may provide a welcome boost to economic activity. If, 
however, the economy is already suffering from signs of overheating, measures to offset the 
unwarranted demand stimulus generated by EU funds may be in place. In the Baltics, where there is 
little room for monetary or wage policy, a tightening of non-EU related fiscal spending may be one 
of the few instruments left.  
Balance of Payments 
Transfers from and to the EU will have profound effects on the balance of payment in the 
NMS. In the first instance, these flows will need to be recorded either in the capital or the current 
account, depending on whether they are used for investment purposes or for current expenditures. 
The accounting is not always precise, as some funds could finance both kinds of spending. Text 
Table 3 shows a schematic classification of how various sorts of EU funds enter external sector 
statistics. The ultimate impact on the balance of payments will depend on important second-round 
effects (e.g., the import propensity of EU-funded projects and real appreciation pressures). Such an 
analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Text Table 3: Classification of EU-related transfers in the Balance of Payments 
 
 Current account Capital account 
Transfers from the EU:   
Budget compensation   
Agriculture    
Structural funds:   
  ESF   
  ERDF   
  EAGGF (guidance)   
  FIFG   
Cohesion funds, ISPA   
Community initiatives, internal policies   
Pre-accession instruments:   
  SAPARD   
  PHARE   
Contributions to the EU:   
Own resources and TOR    
Contributions to EU institutions   
 
Source: Statistical Office of The European Communities, Current and capital transfers from the EU. A proposed 
treatment, 1996. 
 
 
 
EU-related transfers complicate the 
analysis of external sustainability. As shown 
in Figure 10, EU funds have in the first 
instance primarily led to an increase of inward 
capital transfers, a trend that is likely to 
intensify over the next years as the importance 
of structural and cohesion funds increases. 
The current account balance is affected to a 
much lesser extent (at least initially) because 
contributions to the EU partly offset 
agricultural and other current transfers from 
the EU. These non-debt-creating flows call for 
some caution in assessing the external 
position of the NMS by using traditional 
indicators, such as the overall current account 
deficit. Even if import-intensive projects lead 
to a deterioration of the current account in the 
short term, this may be largely funded by 
capital transfers from the EU, with a low risk 
of sudden stops. External sustainability will 
also be affected with the real appreciation 
associated with substantial foreign-exchange 
denominated inflows.  
 
  
Fig 10. 
EU8: BoP impact of EU-related transfers 
(in percent of GDP) 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
EU-related transfers are set to substantially impact the macroeconomic situation in the NMS. 
We have only focused on the magnitudes and institutional issues involved, disregarding funds 
intended positive effects on structural change and economic catch-up in the NMS. But even a rough 
analysis of accounting identities and the first-round impact shows how EU funds can complicate 
fiscal policy and demand management. For example, we find that EU-related transfers may have 
ceteris paribus led to a fiscal drag of ½ -1 percent of GDP and an additional aggregate demand 
stimulus of up to 1 percent of GDP. These effects are likely to grow substantially under the NFP for 
2007-13, which allocates additional EU resources, especially structural funds, to the NMS. The 
paper highlights how much any such estimate depends on the extent to which EU funds replace 
existing spending plans by both the private and the public sector. 
 
The use of EU funds involves policy tradeoffs. Policy makers need to square the circle of 
exploiting the enormous opportunities offered by the access to “free money” from Brussels while at 
the same time guarding against any destabilizing macroeconomic side-effects. One aspect 
highlighted in this paper is the need to restructure budgetary spending to make sure that the co-
financing needs associated with EU funds do not lead to an unwarranted fiscal expansion. A fuller 
analysis of the macroeconomic policy implications of EU funds, including monetary policy, would 
require a model that adequately incorporates second-round effects on both the demand and supply 
side of the economy. 
 
 
APPENDIX I. EU FUNDS AVAILABLE TO THE NEW MEMBER STATES (NMS) 
 
Agriculture 
 
There are several components of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) available to the new 
member states (NMS):  
 
• Market measures: purchase of unprocessed food at intervention price and subsidies to non-EU 
exports;  
 
• Direct payments: payments to farmers based on farm area and type of production; in the NMS 
these are lower than in the EU-15: direct payments were 25 percent of the EU-15 level in 2004 
and have been increased by 5 percentage points a year reaching 40 percent in 2007; the increase 
will be 10 percentage points a year between 2008-13 to equalize payments with the EU-15 by 
2013; NMS may top-up direct payments: such top-ups cannot exceed 30 percent of the EU-15 
level, and the sum of EU payments and top-ups cannot be higher than payments received by 
farmers in EU-15; 
 
• Rural development (EAGGF guarantee section): so called CAP pillar II to provide support to 
farms in less favourable areas (LFA), forestation of land, structural pensions (paid to those who 
transfer farms to young farmers), food-processing, or training of farmers; EAGGF guarantee and 
guidance (see below) sections are merged under the 2007-13 financial perspective into the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD); 
 
• Fisheries (EFF): fund created to support the fisheries sectors under the 2007-13 financial 
perspective; this task was financed with the structural fund FIFG (see below) in 2004-06. 
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Structural funds 
 
Structural funds finance programs under the following objectives: Objective 1—economic catch-up 
in less developed regions (GDP per capita less than 75 percent of EU average), Objective 2—
economic and social cohesion in areas facing structural difficulties (e.g., rural, fisheries); Objective 
3—training and promotion of employment in regions not eligible under Objective 1 (for example, 
the Prague region in the Czech Republic). These objectives account for 94 percent of structural 
allocations for the NMS. There are four structural funds to finance the above objectives:  
• European Regional Development Fund (ERDF): financing Objectives 1 and 2  
• European Social Fund (ESF): financing Objectives 1, 2 and 3 
• European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)—guidance section: financing 
Objective 1 in agriculture; it is merged with the guarantee section under the 2007-13 financial 
perspective (see above);  
• Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG): financing Objective 1 in the fisheries 
sector. This fund is converted into the European Fund for Fisheries (EFF) and classified together 
with agricultural funds in the 2007-13 financial perspective. 
 
Other structural funds, so called Community Initiatives, aimed at solving problems common to a 
number of member states and regions include: Interreg III (cross-border cooperation), Urban II 
(innovative strategies in urban areas), Equal (combating labor market discrimination), and Leader + 
(rural development initiatives). Community Initiatives accounted for some 5 percent of structural 
funds in 2004-06. 
 
Cohesion Fund  
 
Cohesion fund: this fund is available to countries with GDP per capita below 90 percent of the EU 
average. It does not finance programs, but is used to directly support large infrastructure projects in 
transportation and environment. 
 
Internal policies 
 
NMS receive funding within the existing EU policy priorities mainly for:  
•  nuclear safety: decommissioning of power plants;  
•  Schengen: to strengthen control of the EU border and to comply with the Schengen Treaty. 
 
Pre-accession aid  
 
This financial assistance is aimed at facilitating adjustment to full membership including to build 
absorption capacity for EU funds; as such it is not a part of the 2004-06 package. However, 
disbursements of remaining pre-accession resources continue also after accession. There were three 
pre-accession instruments:  
• Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring of the Economy (PHARE);  
• Instrument for Structural Policies for pre-Accession (ISPA); ISPA’s role is close to cohesion 
funds and these two types of funding are usually merged in reporting; 
• Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD). 
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Budget compensation  
 
Budget compensation: an unconditional payment from the EU budget agreed at the last stage of the 
accession negotiations. The main goals were to ensure that new members did not become net 
contributors, and to improve budget liquidity. In part it was financed directly from the EU budget 
and in part with resources shifted from structural funds allocated to NMS. This is not a regular EU 
fund, and the NMS which acceded in 2004 will not receive compensation after 2006; Romania and 
Bulgaria will receive budget compensation until 2009.  
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The macroeconomic effects of structural and cohesion funds 
 
- András Oszlay (ICEG European Center) - 
 
An increasing share of EU funds is devoted to put the member states’ economies on a faster and 
more stable growth track, or at least to achieve lasting impacts that can contribute to the creation 
of new jobs (or the preserving of already existing jobs). For the new member states of the EU it is 
especially the Structural and Cohesion Funds that play a crucial role. It is rather self-explanatory, 
since of the 85 convergence regions within EU-27 59 is located in the new member states11 (see 
Figure 1). Convergence regions are those, where per capita national incomes are below 75% of 
the EU-27’s average. 
 
Figure 1. Convergence regions in the EU (with orange shading) 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission – DG REGIO 
 
From the inspection of the above figure it is clearly seen, that with the exception of two regions, all 
the regions in the new member states are convergence regions, and are thus the main targets of 
the Union’s cohesion policy. Of the two remaining regions Central Hungary is a so called phasing-
in region, and is thus still eligible for cohesion policy instruments, while Prague region in the Czech 
Republic (alone from the regions of the new member states) is already a competitiveness region. 
                                                 
11 Throughout this text we use this term to cover eight countries that became members on May 1, 2004 (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and two countries that joined the EU on January 1, 
2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).  
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The inflows from the Structural and Cohesion Funds (hereafter convergence funds) can principally 
affect the most important real macroeconomic variables through two main channels as explained in 
the figure below. 
 
Figure 2. Simplified impact mechanism of convergence funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: direct effects are represented by continuous lines, indirect links with dashed lines 
 
Should the inflow of funds finance directly investment into fixed assets, this will lead to a fall in real 
user costs. This, in itself, results in increased gross fixed capital formation. Another source of 
growth of investment into fixed assets is that firms increasingly substitute labour with the relatively 
cheap capital, where this is technologically possible. Thus, the direct effects of such use of 
Structural and Cohesion Funds are positive in the case of gross fixed capital formation, but 
negative in the case of labour. Since, however, more investment into fixed assets will also lead to 
faster growth, it still has a positive indirect effect on job creation. Thus, whether this kind of use of 
the funds lead to employment growth, depends on the relative size of the direct and indirect 
effects. From a pure theoretical point of view, the latter can be more significant, but it also depends 
on how productive the underlying investments turn out to be. 
In the cases, when convergence funds finance infrastructural developments, education (or training) 
and research and development activities, an improvement in total factor productivity is expected. 
Since the same output can be produced with less capital and less labour if productivity is higher, 
the direct effect on labour is negative again, but in this case it is also negative for gross fixed 
capital formation. In reality, it is more likely, that output will not remain at the same level, but 
expand in the case of a positive productivity shock, which indirectly again leads to employment 
growth and investment growth. What’s more, improving productivity also leads to a downward 
pressure on the costs of production, which can spill over to the final sales prices, eventually also 
affecting inflation. 
In sum, the inflow of convergence funds has a definite positive contribution to economic growth (at 
least in principle), but the effect on labour is not straightforward. Even in the case of growth, it 
needs deeper examination, whether the positive effects emerge only in the period of the extension 
of the funds, or a permanently higher growth rate can be achieved. Thorough quantitative analyses 
are needed to answer, which of these propositions hold true in reality. 
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Effects on economic growth: quantitative methods 
The main subject of assessing the impact of convergence funds with more sophisticated 
quantitative methods is that of economic growth. This doesn’t come as a surprise, since the main 
aim of these funds is to help real convergence12, i.e. to support the least developed countries and 
regions of the EU to close the income gap with the developed ones. Whether the funds do have 
such an effect is assumed to be best captured in the development of GDP-figures. 
There are two main approaches to analyse the impact of convergence funds in a systematic 
quantitative manner: simulation with general equilibrium models and econometric analysis. It is 
important to to declare in advance, that both approaches have severe weaknesses, and in no way 
can one of them judged to be superior. The reason why it has to be stressed right at the onset is 
that the two approaches lead to significantly different assessments of the impact of convergence 
funds on economic growth. 
Model simulations  
Model simulations are mostly based on computable general equilibrium models, the parameters of 
which are not the results of estimation from observations, rather, they are calibrated13. The inflow 
from convergence funds is treated as additional public investments that increase the stock of 
capital in various sectors of the economy. To evaluate the effect of the funds, a baseline version of 
the model, that excludes these additional public investments is also needed. Thus the impact of 
convergence funds is captured as a difference between the simulated model and the baseline 
model. 
An important characteristic of these models is that they assume productive public investments that 
are performed in the most efficient manner. They usually also assume that a given economy can 
absorb all the funds, that were allocated to it in the financial programming period that spans out to 
seven years. Also an integral part of these models is that the principle of additionality is not 
violated, i.e. these funds are not substitutes for such state investments that should be executed 
anyway, but they generate excess investment. Consequently, what these type of models estimate 
is in fact can be regarded as the most favourable, potential effect of the convergence funds on 
economic growth.  
The European Commission has two model families to examine the effect of convergence funds on 
economic growth. The first is called Hermin, which has a neo-keynesian approach. The production 
side of the economy of a given country is represented by two sectors: an industrial one and 
another that provides services. The output of the former is influenced by external (world) demand, 
world prices of goods and commodities and the relative costs of production. The services sector is 
less sensitive to world prices and relative costs, but is largely determined by developments in 
domestic demand. In the case of public investments (remember, convergence funds are treated as 
additional public investments) Hermin does not only assume a direct effect on growth through 
increased capital stock, but also an indirect effect through the accumulation of human capital and 
knowledge. Expectations in Hermin are mostly adaptive (i.e. backward looking). 
                                                 
12 Convergence has two meanings in this context. Absolute convergence refers to the catching up of national incomes to 
the Union’s average. However the return to a country’s long-term income level – following the derailment caused by the 
years of central planning and the subsequent transition shock – is also considered convergence. This is referred to as 
conditional convergence. 
13 Calibration broadly means, that the model’s parameters are chosen in such a way, that the initial state of the model is 
stable equilibrium, thus in response to a one-off shock the model returns to this equilibrium state.  
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The other model family of the Commission is the QUEST-II, which is more neoclassical in its 
approach. Another marked difference from Hermin is that this is a real multisector model with 
forward looking expectations. On the production side output is determined by sectoral production 
functions. On the demand side QUEST-II has intertemporally optimising households (i.e. private 
consumption is dependent on both current and discounted future income). Also a deviation in 
QUEST-II is the endogeneity of the real interest rate (this was exogenously given in Hermin). This 
has a serious consequence, as a catch-up process usually involves the real appreciation of the 
domestic currency. When the interest rate is endogenous, it will rise in periods of real appreciation, 
leading to a crowding out of private investment. Through this channel QUEST-II has a tendency to 
estimate smaller growth effects in general than does Hermin. 
For the former cohesion countries of the EU-15 (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) Hermin 
estimated an additional GDP-growth from 1 to 1.5% on average over the horizon of a seven-year 
financial programming period. With the assumption, that no further inflows from convergence funds 
take place following the expiry of the financial programming period, on a longer term the level of 
GDP would only be 1% higher than in the baseline scenario. As it was already hypothesised, 
QUEST-II estimates an even smaller extra growth in the range of 0.5 to 1% during a seven-year 
financial programming period. One can thus see, that while the estimated effects of convergence 
funds on economic growth are indeed positive, the size of the induced changes are not so 
impressive. 
There were experiments with Hermin to assess the possible effects of convergence funds on the 
Hungarian economy as well. The simulation was made on data available in 2004 (the year when 
Hungary joined The European Union) and estimations were made to the 2007-2013 financial 
programming period as well as for the financial programming period beginning in 2014. At the time 
of the calculations it was assumed that the own contribution from the Hungarian state budget 
would be 40% on average, but by now it is obvious, that between 2007 and 2013 the average own 
contribution will be only around 20%. The average annual inflow is also expected to be larger than 
it was anticipated at the time of the simulation exercise. Another important aspect of the simulation 
was the composition of the inflows: it was assumed that some 60% of the funds will finance 
infrastructural developments, approximately 20% will be devoted to investments into human capital 
and the remaining 20% will be an addition to private investment resources. 
With these assumptions it was estimated, that the level of Hungarian GDP by 2013 (the end-year 
of the recent financial programming period) would be 8.4% larger than in the baseline case (i.e. 
without convergence interventions). A significant increase in employment is another result from the 
simulation: compared to the baseline 4.5% more jobs could be filled in 2013, should the inflow of 
convergence funds proceed according to the given assumptions. The level of investments would 
be outstanding (41% higher than in the baseline scenario), but this would imply a deterioration in 
the external balance: the external financing requirements could be on average 3% higher (relative 
to GDP) in each year of the financial programming period than in the baseline case. 
Assuming no more inflows from convergence funds after 2013, the estimated effects would all 
diminish by 2020. The level of GDP would be only 4% higher than without the inflow of 
convergence funds between 2007 and 2013, while there would remain virtually nothing from the 
additional jobs (compared to the baseline) that were present in 2013. With the huge amount of the 
investments maturing in this period, however, external financing requirements would be on 
average 1.5% of GDP less than in the baseline model. 
We have no knowledge of similar simulation for Hungary with QUEST-II, however there is a 
Hungarian model, the EcoRET, which was developed by the University of Pécs to evaluate the 
effects of development policy. Its first bloc estimates the effects of the inflow of convergence funds 
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on total factor productivity, then its second bloc goes on to infer the effects of the main 
macroeconomic variables. The first experiments with EcoRET indicated a rather modest 
contribution of the convergence funds to both economic growth and employment and yet a sharp 
deterioration in the external balance indicators. However, these first results were not comparable to 
the ones from Hermin, as the database and the forecasting period were all different. To gain more 
reliable and comparable estimations, EcoRET were integrated into a spatial computable general 
equilibrium (SCGE) type model, the RAEM-Light, which is also capable of quantifying regional 
(spatial), not just economy-wide effects. 
This modified version of EcoRET resulted in quite a similar estimate in the case of additional GDP-
growth than did Hermin. By 2013, the level of Hungarian GDP could be 7.5% higher than in the 
baseline case (i.e. without inflows from EU funds). In the case of employment and investment, 
however, the estimated gains are much lower than in the case of Hermin.  
 
 Table 1. Hungary: Estimated growth effects compared to the baseline in the  
2007-2013 financial programming period 
 Hermin EcoRET 
Level of GDP (2013) +8,4% +7,5% 
Level of employment (2013) +4,5% +2,6% 
Level of GFCF (2013) +41,0% +13,3% 
External financing requirement 
(% of GDP, annual average) -3,0% - 
 
Econometric analyses 
In contrast to simulations from general equilibrium models, econometric analyses do not estimate 
the potential effects convergence funds, but only the actual ones that can be inferred from past 
observations. Since in reality the use of the convergence funds is far from being perfect (efficient 
allocation is not guaranteed, absorption is not complete and the principle of additionality is often 
violated14), the estimated effects from econometric analyses are usually significantly smaller than 
in the case of model simulations, or are almost negligible. However, one should be aware of the 
weaknesses of the econometric approach: data are often rare and of poor quality (overly 
heterogeneous), thus the estimates are not always reliable. 
Boldrin and Canova15 found that convergence funds did not have a marked contribution to 
economic growth. They explained this by the system of convergence support itself. Since neither 
the setup of the system, nor the use of the funds is market oriented, they are essentially under the 
influence of political targets and ambitions instead of economic ones. Based on this, the authors 
proposed the thorough restructuring of the system of EU funding in the case of convergence goals. 
Ederveen et al16 were able to detect some convergence that is to be attributed to the convergence 
funds themselves, however, it was at best conditional and definitely not absolute convergence. 
They also pointed out to the fact, that the effects of convergence funds are crucially determined by 
                                                 
14 As additionality is a crucial element in EU funding, it is of course rare, that it is violated, at least in legal terms. But in 
fact by manipulating the structure of public investments the principle of additionality is often violated in economic terms.  
15 Boldrin, M. – Canova, F. (2001): Inequality and Convergence in Europe’s Regions: Reconsidering European Regional 
Policies. In: Economic Policy: a European Forum. (32) pp 205-245. 
16 Ederveen, S. – Gorter, J. – de Mooij, R. – Nahuis, R. (2003): Funds and Games: The Economics of European 
Cohesion Policy. ENEPRI, Occasional Paper Nr. 3. 
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the quality of the institutions that are responsible for the coordination and allocation of funds within 
the individual economies. To illustrate, how imperfect these institutions are, they gave an 
estimation to the extent, with which additionality was violated between 1989 and 1993. According 
to their findings, 17% of all convergence support financed in fact such investments, which should 
have been undertaken even without the common cohesion policy tools. 
Econometric analyses thus resulted in much smaller estimated growth effects of convergence 
funds than did model simulations. The main reason behind this is the poor quality of the 
institutions, which was not acknowledged in general equilibrium models. There was, however, 
another important finding in econometric analyses: more open economies (i.e. those, which trade 
more intensively with the rest of the world) can enjoy larger growth effects from the inflow of 
convergence funds than closed ones. While the quality of the institutional environment is also a 
source of concern in the case of Hungary, it is still one of the most open economies among the 
new member states of the EU, thus at least we can expect some positive impulses from the inflow 
of convergence funds as well. 
Effects on the external balance, prices and the exchange rate 
When examining the effects of convergence funds on the external balance we can also distinguish 
direct and indirect effects. Direct effects are exhibited in financial flows that accompany projects 
that are co-financed by the EU, while indirect effects can be traced in future financial flows 
originating from projects that were finished earlier. 
Direct effects can thus be easily identified in the balance of payments statistics: inflows are 
registered either among current transfers in the current account or in the appropriate credit line of 
the capital account17. However, as EU member states are not just net recipients from the EU 
budget, but also contribute to it, this payment should also be classified as a direct effect on the 
external balance. And finally, since the incoming flows finance projects that usually have high 
import content, this additional import should also be included in the direct effects. 
From the above it doesn’t come as a surprise, that net direct effects should not necessarily be 
positive (i.e. decreasing the external financing requirement o fan economy). While the contribution 
to the EU budget should be transferred on a regular basis, in periods, when there are only a few 
projects that are co-financed by the EU, direct effects can temporarily be negative. But even if 
inflows completely offset the payments to the EU budget, some of the projects might have such 
high import need, that combined direct effects still turn out to be negative. This can especially be 
characteristic for the first years of EU membership, as co-financed projects are typically import 
intensive in this period (in lack of domestic suppliers), and the absorption rate is relatively low due 
to institutional weaknesses and inexperience. This was already seen above, when interpreting 
results from the Hermin model for Hungary (the estimated average annual external financing need 
was 3 percentage point higher relative to GDP between 2007 and 2013 than in the case of no 
convergence interventions), but it was also observed in former cohesion countries. 
Indirect effects are not so easy to trace, as these originate from such co-financed projects that 
created extra export capacities or infrastructural facilities that are also used by non-residents in 
exchange of paying a fee. These indirect effects are predominantly positive, and in time they are 
supposed to dominate over direct effects. This can also be confirmed by model simulations. As we 
                                                 
17 Whether an inflow from convergence funds belong to current or capital transfers is not always straightforward. In 
principle, the current account records such financial flows between residents and non-residents that also influence the 
generation of national income. Capital transfers, on the other hand, only influence the international investment position of 
the country, but not the national income. While for balance of payments statisticians this problem is there to be solved, 
from our viewpoint it is irrelevant, since it is mainly the volume of the inflows that really counts. 
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could already see, Hermin predicted lower external financing requirement for Hungary in the 
financial programming period that begins in 2014 than in the baseline case of no EU funding, and 
again, the experience of former cohesion countries also confirm, that total effects on the external 
balance can be positive. 
Why the direction of the effects of convergence funds on absolute and relative costs of capital are 
relatively clear, this is not so in the case of other costs and prices. A natural starting point is to 
assume that incoming EU funds help improving total factor productivity. This will lead to a decrease 
in production costs, which in turn can lead to lower final sales prices (thus eventually also bringing 
down inflation). This last link, however, is rather weak even on a pure theoretical basis, and neither 
it is confirmed by model simulations. EcoRET for example estimates slightly higher inflation 
assuming EU funding that in the baseline scenario. This is because convergence funds also have 
a significant positive effect on domestic demand, that creates some inflationary pressure. But the 
inflation difference between the two scenarios is quite small and can easily be neglected. 
It is also recurring from time to time, that a massive inflow of convergence funds can lead to the 
nominal appreciation of the domestic currency. Since, however, the inflow of EU funds is always 
connected to definite projects (definite demand), and a good part of them surely has high import 
requirement, in fact there is only a limited increase in liquidity, thus the exchange rate should 
remain intact. Indeed, the recent appreciation of the currencies of some of the new member states 
rather reflect increased investor interest in these economies, and in no way can they be attributed 
to the inflow of convergence funds. 
Fiscal effects 
When speaking about the fiscal effects of convergence funds, it has to be noted, that there are 
other forms of support from the EU than Structural and Cohesion Funds, and these all affect the 
fiscal stance. Thus, EU subsidies to the agricultural sector, direct aids and sources allocated for 
rural development also flow through the budget and can temporarily modify the fiscal balance. 
Again, we can distinguish between direct and indirect effects. Direct effects are partly costs: the 
compulsory payments to the EU budget (as described in the previous section of the paper), the 
costs of meeting the legal, environmental and safety standards of the EU, partly benefits: inflow 
from pre-accession funds, convergence funds, agricultural subsidies and direct aids. Indirect fiscal 
effects emanate from extra economic growth generated by convergence funds, the expected 
convergence of interest rates (the narrowing of the risk premium) and the positive or negative 
effects of the harmonisation of the tax system with the rest of EU economies. 
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Direct effects, especially in the first years following EU accession, are mostly negative. This is 
because the costs of compliance with the prescribed EU standards can be high (the creation of a 
new legal and institutional environment, the implementation of safety rules and environmental 
regulation etc.). In their studies Backé18 as well as Kopits and Székely19 find, that the short-term 
direct fiscal effect of EU funds are negative. A rough estimation from the latter authors is an 
average annual 0.75 percentage point deterioration (relative to GDP) in the budget balance for 
Hungary for the 2004-2006 period. 
Both papers go on to discuss the possible extent of indirect effects and come to the conclusion that 
these are predominantly positive. Yet, the combined long-term effect of EU funds on the fiscal 
balance is more likely to be neutral or very slightly positive at best. This is because the cost of 
maintenance of the infrastructure that was created by the use of EU funds will also be significant 
on a long run. Thus, in fact, the total effect of EU funds on the fiscal stance is far from being 
certain. Some factors that do influence the final size of these effects are (i) whether additionality is 
violated or not, (ii) the rate of absorption of the funds and (iii) the eventual share of co-financing. 
Conclusion 
The new member states of the EU will enjoy a significant inflow from the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds of the common budget throughout the 2007-2013 financial programming period. Assuming 
complete absorption, these inflows could account for 3-4% of GDP annually, which is a sizeable 
addition to development resources. The prime reason of these funds is to promote the 
convergence process, thus it is encouraging to see, that quantitative analyses mostly confirmed a 
positive effect of these funds on economic growth. While model simulations predicted relatively 
stronger effects, econometric analyses resulted in modest improvements compared to the baseline 
scenario of no convergence funds. It is also a common finding of these models, that employment 
can only increase temporarily, and on a longer run employment rates are not really higher due to 
these inflows. 
The development of external balance indicators exhibit a different pattern: in the first years external 
financing requirements mostly deteriorate reflecting faster investment activity that has high import 
content, but on a longer run – due to increased export capacities and improved competitiveness – 
the reliance on foreign funds will decrease. The effects on prices and the exchange rate are only 
minor and can in fact be neglected. The fiscal balance can worsen especially in the early period of 
the receiving of funds, since many institutional and legislative changes should be done to efficiently 
allocate EU funds. On a longer horizon here are positive indirect effects as well, but in general the 
convergence fund’s long-term effects on the state budget will be neutral or at best very slightly 
positive. 
                                                 
18 Backé, P. (2002): Fiscal Effects of EU Membership for Central European and Baltic EU Accession Countries. In: 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank: Focus on Transition Nr. 2. pp 151-164. 
19 Kopits, Gy. – Székely, I. (2003): Fiscal Policy Challenges for the Baltics and Central Europe. In: Tumpel-Gugerell G. – 
Mooslechner, P.: Structural Challenges for Europe. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
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Growth and competitiveness in the new member states 
 
- Szabolcs Erdős (ICEG European Center) - 
 
 
Growth theories predict that low-income economies tend to grow faster because of higher marginal 
product of capital. This claim seems to hold true when we examine the macroeconomic situation of 
the new member states20 in the past decade. Since 1996 real GDP growth has resumed in all 
examined countries, reflecting progress in macroeconomic stabilisation and the implementation of 
a wide range of structural reforms. The relatively strong growth performance in EU8 countries 
relative to the euro area also led to some progress in real convergence, defined here as 
convergence in per capita income levels. 
 
Figure 1. Annual average GDP-growth, 2000-2006 
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Source: Eurostat 
Over the past years, new member states have seen strong economic growth. Gross capital 
formation, fostered by rapid foreign direct investment growth, has been the main driving force. In 
most new member states, the reasons for relocations to (or within) the region were: low labour 
costs and soft labour market regulations; tax incentives; explicit subsidies granted by public 
authorities; proximity to large consumer markets (mainly the old member states themselves). 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Throughout this text we use this term to cover eight countries that became members on May 1, 2004 (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and two countries that joined the EU on January 1, 
2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). 
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Figure 2. The composition of growth (average annual rates, 2000-2006) 
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Source: Eurostat 
Correlation analyses suggest that countries that have received more FDI have built up their capital 
stock in recent years more rapidly, with Latvia and Lithuania being exceptions, as investment 
growth in these two countries was the highest among the new member states, yet, their FDI inflows 
were among the lowest. The role of foreign direct investments in the most attractive new member 
states was quite important given FDI’s huge potential in the modernization process, the renovation 
of managerial qualification, and, in particular, contributing to the spreading of technology and skills. 
 
Figure 3. FDI inflows in the new member states (in EUR million) 
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Source: Eurostat 
EU8+2: new member states as specified in Footnote 1; EU8: except Bulgaria and Romania 
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As to the prospects for further FDI inflows, privatisation has largely ceased to be a main driver of 
FDI in these countries. Against this background, the institutional and business environment, as well 
as economic factors that attract non-privatisation-related FDI, will become increasingly more 
important. In particular, a stable macroeconomic environment, labour costs that develop in line with 
productivity, the availability of skilled labour and a sufficiently developed infrastructure are needed 
to secure future FDI inflows. 
R&D and innovative capacities play a key role for competitiveness. A relatively low involvement of 
the business sector in the financing of R&D projects appears to be one of the prime reasons 
behind the poor R&D performance of the EU8.  
 
Figure 4. R&D and GDP (average annual growth rate, 2000-2005) 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
Although the new member states belong to the European single market, attracting FDI (that has a 
large contribution to export growth) in the longer run will require better skills and better 
technologies. The new member states need to restructure their exports towards more 
technologically advanced products and services. But as the experts of ECB say: „Since the EU8 
are not yet at the technological frontier, in the short term lower R&D spending does not necessarily 
hamper their chances of catching up”.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 http://www.ecb.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp61.pdf 
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Figure 5. Business enterprise R&D expenditure (% of GDP, 2005) 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
On a longer run it is important to ensure the credible monetary policy and appropriate fiscal policy 
mix for further growth and convergence. The new member states need to address structural labour 
market problems, in particular by reducing regional disparities and skill mismatches. These 
countries also must make further efforts to improve the structural funds related institutions, in order 
to ensure that investments increase and are productive. Many of the above-mentioned factors of 
growth-enhancing policies will also help to ensure a continued inflow of FDI, which is expected to 
help accelerate the convergence process.  
 
Figure 6. Global Competitiveness Index, 2006 
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Source: World Economic Forum 
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Some of the new member states now face serious risks: there are large current account deficits in 
many of them, and some also has fiscal problems. In the latter economies (especially Hungary and 
to a lesser extent Poland) the adjustment program of the government is not fully credible. Credible 
policy provides provide an anchor for investors expectations. 
Looking at investment into human capital development, the new member states exhibit a mixed 
picture. Some indicators of educational attainment (public expenditure on education, share of the 
labour force with at least secondary education) suggest a favourable situation for these countries 
relative to the Euro Area. However, other indicators – for example those related to research input 
(R&D spending as a percentage of GDP) – offer a less favourable view. The still ongoing process 
of sectoral transition (away from agriculture and industry to services) has been accompanied by an 
increasing degree of mismatch between labour supply and job vacancies. From a forward-looking 
perspective, structural policies aimed at improving the accumulation of human capital will play a 
crucial role in overcoming labour market mismatches, in particular educational mismatches. 
According to the latest figures, unemployment rates continued to fall. In several countries 
unemployment rates declined to historically low levels. Employment rates in Latvia, and also in 
Estonia reached the highest levels since the start of transition. Nevertheless, further employment 
increases may be limited because of the structural nature of joblessness and emigration. 
In May 2004 eight post-socialist countries joined the European Union, and two additional countries 
joined three years later. Almost all regions of the new member states have per-capita GDPs that 
are below 75 percent of the EU average, so all the new member states qualify for the EU’s 
structural and cohesion funds, which are intended to help them „catch up”. If they are well used, 
the structural funds offer the new member states unparalleled opportunities for economic growth, 
social cohesion, and human development. 
The experiences clearly show that a high absorption rate of these funds requires solid preparation 
of the central administration, in the form of strong national policy frameworks, inter-ministerial 
coordination, well designed national programmes and implementation capacity. Partnerships with 
regional and local governments, private sector business and non-governmental organisations are 
also essential. In sum, preparation for absorbing the structural funds is often less about market 
democracy than about modernizing state bureaucracy and helping them to work with local 
governments and NGOs. 
The new member states have come a long way since the early 1990s, but this is not the end of 
their transition. Many challenges are still ahead and the real convergence process is far from being 
finished. Although living standards have improved considerably, the per capita income gap versus 
the average levels in the EU is still significant. 
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Jobless growth in the new member states? 
 
- Béla Galgóczi (European Trade Union Institute) - 
 
 
Transformation economies in Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) are often framed as countries with 
high growth but low job creation. Is jobless growth in the region indeed a general phenomenon? In 
the next sections we take a look at the specific macroeconomic features of the CEE transformation 
economies; then we examine certain developments on their labour markets between 2000 and 
2006. Finally we devote some space to macroeconomic policy considerations with a focus on the 
application of the Stability and Growth Pact criteria for the region. 
  
Different socio-economic framework of CEE transformation economies 
CEE economies are still in transformation and have a genuinely different macroeconomic profile 
than the stable market economies of the EU15. National economies still under transformation are 
characterised by dynamic growth, including high but uneven productivity increases. 
A fundamental restructuring of these economies took place in the second half of the nineties as 
they became reintegrated into the world economy. The driving force of this was mostly foreign 
direct investment and to a lesser extent mobilisation of internal resources through redistribution of 
income from the population towards the enterprise sphere. Even so transformation remains 
incomplete in most countries (the issues include large and inefficient agricultural sectors in some 
countries, as well as unresolved problems related to steel, coal and mining). Their ‘transformational 
character’ also manifests itself in terms of distortions (different price and cost structures) as an 
inheritance of the previous economic model and disproportionalities (wage and productivity 
relations) due to turbulent transformation processes. The dynamism of industry (and of the tradable 
sector in general) is much greater than that of the non-tradable sector. 
The most important factors that underline the different macroeconomic framework of CEE 
transformation economies compared to the developed market economies of the EU15 are the 
following: 
• Lower GDP per capita levels, with more dynamism (close to 10% nominal growth rates, 
with high but uneven productivity growth), ongoing transformation and convergence (catch-
up process). Real convergence proceeds dynamically, as GDP per capita levels at PPP 
compared to the Eurozone average between 1995 and 2005 illustrate: 
 
 
Czech Republic:  63.6 – 67.3    
Estonia:   29.8 – 49.7 
Hungary:   46.6 – 59.2 
Lithuania:   30.4 – 46.1 
Latvia:   25.7 – 43.8 
Poland:   36.6 – 45.1 
Slovenia:   64.0 – 77.1 
Slovakia:   42.0 – 52.1  
 
• Low wage levels and high wage dynamics can be seen as a sign of wage convergence 
backed by high productivity increases. This however conflicts with the fulfilment of the 
Maastricht inflation criterion.  
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Source: AMECO
Yearly compensation per employee, 2006 (1000 Euro)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
LV LT SK PL EE CZ HU PT SI GR ES E
U-
25
IT FI SE AT UK DE IE FR DK BE NL LU
 
 
As the above figure shows, differences of wage levels within the EU25 are tenfold, with Latvia and 
Luxembourg being the extreme cases (with the EU accession of Bulgaria, differences within the 
EU27 have grown to 1:20). On the other hand, wage dynamics show precisely the opposite picture, 
as the next figure illustrates. Since the introduction of the single currency, wage increases in five of 
the new member states were roughly 10 times those of Germany or Austria when calculated on 
euro basis. 
 
Source: AMECO
Change in nominal yearly compensation per employee in Euro, 1999-2006 
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• Prices in the new member states are significantly below the EU25 level, ranging from 
76.4% in Slovenia to 54.7% in Lithuania. 
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Inward FDI stock per capita in NMS-5 
in EUR, 2003-2006
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• Transformation and the fundamental structural change of the economy is driven by foreign 
direct investments (FDI) and foreign investment enterprises (FIE) have contribute greatly to 
exports, GDP growth and productivity growth. Some of the CEE countries have the highest 
levels of per capita inward FDI stock within the EU and the trend is growing as figures from 
2003 and 2006 demonstrate. 
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• Uneven productivity growth with a huge gap between the tradable (triggered by the high 
productivity of foreign investment enterprises) and the non-tradable sectors is characteristic 
for all CEE economies. This is in line with general trends of catching-up economies, where 
productivity in tradable goods sectors will tend to rise faster than in non-tradable sectors 
(Balassa-Samuelson effect). Since wage increases tend to be more or less similar in all 
sectors, relatively faster productivity growth in the tradable sector of accession countries 
will convert into a higher inflation rate if the exchange rate remains constant. 
 
• Higher social risks in the form of a ‘welfare deficit’ accumulated during transformation, 
including severe labour market tensions (low employment and/or high unemployment) and 
an increase in poverty and inequality. These need special attention, especially if the 
European Social Model is taken as reference.22 
 
• Economic backwardness, implying a need for greater investment. Public investments in 
infrastructure, health care, education, research and development and environmental 
protection are badly needed for these countries to induce convergence with their more 
developed EU counterparts and to comply with their commitments related to adoption of the 
acquis communautaire. 
 
Labour market developments 
It is widely known that employment rates were characteristically low throughout the transformation 
process in most of the CEE countries, with the exception of Slovenia and the Czech Republic. In 
some countries this has been aggravated by high unemployment (especially Poland and Slovakia). 
Data from 2000 show employment rates characteristically under 60% of the population aged 
between 15 and 64 years, while the corresponding rate for the EU15 was 63.4%. The 
unemployment rate was the highest in Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia in 2000 (16.1%, 16.4% and 
18.8% respectively) and the lowest in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary (8.7%, 5.7% and 
6.1% respectively), while it stood at an average 7.6% in the EU15. 
 
                                                 
22 See more on this in. Rhodes, M and M. Keune (2006): EMU and Welfare State Adjustment in Central and Eastern 
Europe. In: K. Dyson (ed.): Enlarging the Euro-Area: External Empowerment and Domestic Transformation of East 
Central Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 279-301. 
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Source: European Commission, EIE 2007
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The situation shows certain shifts after six years. Only the Baltic states showed substantial 
employment creation in this period with 7.7 and 8.8 percentage points growth in the employment 
rate in Estonia and Latvia. In the case of Poland the already very low rate fell further. At the same 
time, the EU15 showed a rise of the employment rate by 2,6 percentage points. 
 
Source: European Commission, EIE 2007
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Job creation thus did not take place in most of the CEE countries, even though growth rates were 
at the level of 4-5% and inward FDI had been high. Only the Baltic states with 8-10% GDP growth 
could manage to reach significant employment growth. 
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It is peculiar that unemployment decreased at the same time in most of the countries (with the 
exception of Hungary). Poland and Slovakia showed significant decreases of unemployment, 
which was not reflected in job creation. Especially in Poland and Lithuania the decrease of 
unemployment was more due to outward labour migration than to job creation. In Lithuania the 
spectacular improvement of the unemployment rate ran parallel with a modest increase of the 
employment rate, whereas in Poland the rate of unemployment decreased substantially, while the 
employment rate also fell somewhat. 
Jobless growth is thus not verifiable on absolute terms, but indeed on relative terms, as much of 
the growth is due to productivity improvement and mostly due to FDI. It seems, at least on basis of 
the experience of the period 2000-2006 that CEE countries need growth levels above 5% in order 
to achieve stable employment growth. Especially countries with high foreign investment activity the 
employment effects are modest as in these cases GDP growth is fuelled by productivity increases.  
It is also remarkable that when taking averages into account, job creation was more solid in the 
EU15, where economic growth is much slower than in the CEE NMS.  
Contradiction between European objectives regarding CEE countries 
However, it is an objective of most new member states to abandon their low wage profile and 
promote the development of a knowledge-based economy. However, forcing inflation rates to meet 
the SGP level could hamper productivity development, growth and real convergence. 
There are also problems with the fiscal criteria. The aim behind the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) was sustainable public finances by maintaining an appropriate public debt to GDP ratio. The 
rigid SGP criteria – including a 3% public deficit to GDP ratio – were tailored to the growth rates of 
the current EMU countries and to the debt levels of the most indebted countries, such as Belgium 
and Italy. EMU candidates with public debt levels well below the 60% mark and nominal growth 
levels close to 10% could well maintain annual deficits of 4–4.5% without increasing their public 
debt to GDP ratios.23 Given that the ‘straitjacket’ of the current SGP rules is unlikely to fit the 
specifics of these countries, growth, employment and real convergence would seem to be in real 
danger. 
Further arguments refer to welfare risks and public investment, as already mentioned. Most 
transformation countries are afflicted by a ‘welfare deficit’ and are in desperate need of well 
targeted public investments. Here the principles of the European Social Model and the Lisbon 
agenda are indicative. It should also be seen that there is a clear contradiction between the 
objectives of the Lisbon agenda and the current SGP criteria in the CEE new Member States. The 
relation between the SGP criteria and the principles of the European Social Model can also be 
seen as ambiguous. 
The clash of objectives is apparent if the principles of the European Social Model are considered. 
While on the one hand the EU15 countries are becoming increasingly concerned about what they 
call ‘social dumping’ from the East, rigid application of the SGP criteria imposes serious constraints 
on CEE countries, preserving distortions in price and cost structures, and disproportionalities 
between wage and productivity levels. 
If we look at employment issues and objectives, the National Action Plans for Employment (NAPE) 
of most countries have formulated ambitious goals to improve the situation, with particular attention 
to the employment rate, youth unemployment, long-term unemployment and at-risk groups. 
However, labour market policy expenditure is very low and in most cases declining. It is worth 
                                                 
23 Surányi, Gy. (2005) The euro framework must be reformed, The Banker (March), London. 
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adding that expenditure on active measures makes up a tiny – and in most cases declining – 
proportion of total spending. NAPE provisions on upgrading active labour market policies were 
often pushed into the background, as budgets were insufficient to cover even the passive 
measures. It is also worth asking how the ambitious NAPE objectives of the new member states 
match up to their monetary and fiscal convergence plans in the run-up to the euro. 
It seems therefore that the main story in relation to EMU accession and its timing is not the ability 
of these countries to cope with the SGP criteria (as is almost universally declared) but rather its 
rationale and impact. Naturally, the timing of the process is most amenable to rational action. The 
main question in policy terms concerns how the agenda of EMU accession suits the national 
priorities of the new member states. 
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Growth and jobs in the Eastern EU Member States 
 
 - Gábor Pellényi (ICEG European Center) - 
 
 
Introduction 
Jobless growth remains a problem throughout the Eastern EU Member States (EEUMS).24 Activity 
and employment is low in many countries and economic growth does not create as many jobs as in 
Western Europe. This phenomenon has far-reaching consequences; besides being a drag on 
public finances, it also creates social tensions. This paper gives a brief overview of job creation in 
the EEUMS. It assesses the role of labour market institutions and education in job creation before 
pointing out some policy-relevant observations. 
Problems with job creation 
Headline unemployment figures give a favourable first impression of the EEUMS. Although the 
highest rates are still observable in Poland and Slovakia, the rest of the region is either around or 
below the EU average in terms of unemployment. 
 
Figure 1. Harmonised unemployment rates in EU Member States, 2007 
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Note: the horizontal red line indicates the EU27 average. Source: Eurostat 
 
The ranking of EEUMS by unemployment rates changed greatly between 2000 and 2007. The 
Baltic countries managed to reduce their double-digit rates effectively to full employment; Bulgaria 
is following their path. Poland and Slovakia also managed to cut their unemployment rates by 6-7 
percentage points since 2000. Improvements were smaller in the rest of the region and Hungary is 
the only country with rising unemployment since 2000. 
However, employment rates show a less favourable picture. On average these figures are typically 
lower than the EU27 average. Three of the five worst performers in the EU are in Central and 
Eastern Europe with employment figures comparable to that of Italy. More worryingly, the 
                                                 
24 Throughout this paper the Eastern EU Member States (EEUMS) country group consists of Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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employment rate rose by five percentage points in Italy between 2000 and 2007 while it fell in 
Romania and increased by no more than two points in Hungary and Poland. The fast-growing 
Baltic states and comparably richer Slovenia and Czech Republic are in better shape although they 
too lag behind the top performers in Europe. 
 
Figure 2. Employment rates in EU Member States, 2007 
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Note: the horizontal red line indicates the EU27 average. Source: Eurostat 
 
Activity figures depict similar tendencies. They are especially problematic in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania who are all among the laggards of the EU in this respect. Low activity can be 
due to a number of factors: the disillusionment of those unemployed for a long period, inadequate 
incentives to seek employment, or the outward migration of jobseekers, among others. A 
particularly important issue is early retirement, which was often encouraged to tackle high 
unemployment following transition but in effect irreversibly drove out legions of potential workers 
from the labour market. 
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Figure 3. Activity rates in EU Member States, 2007 
50
60
70
80
M
al
ta
H
un
ga
ry
Ita
ly
R
om
an
ia
P
ol
an
d
B
ul
ga
ria
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
G
re
ec
e
B
el
gi
um
Li
th
ua
ni
a
S
lo
va
ki
a
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
Fr
an
ce
S
lo
ve
ni
a
S
pa
in
Ire
la
nd
La
tv
ia
E
st
on
ia
C
yp
ru
s
P
or
tu
ga
l
A
us
tri
a
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
Fi
nl
an
d
G
er
m
an
y
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
S
w
ed
en
D
en
m
ar
k
%
 
Note: the horizontal red line indicates the EU27 average. Source: Eurostat 
 
It is striking that the EU15 countries created more jobs with less growth between 2000 and 2007 
than the EEUMS. The 2001-03 period was characterised by a worldwide economic slowdown in 
growth; some EEUMS countries even experienced recessions, leaving a mark on job creation. 
Since 2004 growth and job creation picked up, thanks to EU accession and a favourable business 
cycle. Still, with more than twice as fast growth the EEUMS could create jobs only as fast as the 
EU15 (see chart 4). Romania is an outlier but its inclusion does not change results. 
 
Figure 4. GDP and employment growth in EU Member States between 2000 and 2007 
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Note: compound annual growth rates, employment according to LFS definition. Light and dark blue dots 
represent EU15 (plus Cyprus and Malta) and EU8+2 countries, respectively. Light and dark blue lines 
represent linear trends for EU15 and EU8+2 countries respectively. Red lines represent EU27 averages. 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat 
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Behind this gloomy overall picture there are mixed individual performances, which can be better 
understood by looking sectoral job creation (chart 5). The fastest employment growth was recorded 
in the Baltic states and Bulgaria, at around 1-2% per year. The role of construction booms behind 
this performance is apparent since construction alone accounted for 40-80% of net employment 
growth between 2000 and 2007 in these countries. Market services were particularly great 
contributors in Hungary, Lithuania and Poland. Industrial employment typically grew at a moderate 
pace but declined in Hungary as traditional low-tech industries were priced out of the market by 
wage increases. The secular decline in agricultural employment is observable throughout the 
region; however the Romanian recession during the period apparently channelled jobseekers back 
to agriculture.  
 
Figure 5. Sectoral contribution to net employment growth between 2000 and 2007 in the 
eastern EU Member States 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
Do institutions matter? 
What explains this apparent weakness in job creation? The literature often turns to institutions to 
explain divergent labour market performance. More generous unemployment benefits, more 
stringent employee protection legislation, sectoral wage bargaining and high tax wedges on labour 
are supposed to be detrimental to job creation and can lead to persistently higher unemployment. 
This argument has been put to test by a number of authors in recent years. Boeri and Garibaldi 
noted that labour market flexibility in Central and Eastern Europe is not bad: they managed to 
reallocate their labour force following transition.25 They point out that employee protection 
legislation is in fact less restrictive in most EEUMS than in Western Europe while minimum wages 
were generally around 30% of average wages as opposed to the OECD average of 60-70%. Union 
density is fairly low, wage bargaining takes place at the company level and they find little evidence 
for unemployment or low wage traps. In other words, actual institutions appear to be favourable for 
job creation. In their opinion the low job content of growth in the 1990s is attributable to the fact 
that productivity growth was associated with job destruction after labour hoarding in the socialist 
                                                 
25 Boeri, T. and P. Garibaldi (2006): Are Labour Markets in the New Member States Sufficiently Flexible for EMU? 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 30, 1393-1407. 
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era. Nevertheless, they fail to explain why the growth elasticity of employment remained low in the 
new millennium. Ederveen and Thissen concluded that labour market institutions explain only a 
small share of the variation in unemployment rates in EEUMS.26 
A casual look at chart 6 gives a similar impression. In most EEUMS labour market regulations do 
not hinder business activities more than in Western Europe. Indeed, Hungary and Estonia are 
perceived by corporate leaders to have business-friendly labour regulations. However, the 
employment rate is just as high in Hungary as in Poland, where regulations are less satisfactory for 
employers. On the other hand, regulations are the most ‘rigid’ in Slovenia, but the country’s 
employment rate is similar to that of Ireland with more ‘flexible’ regulations. 
 
Figure 6. Labour market regulations in selected EU Member States, 2007 
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Note: the horizontal red line indicates the average of available EU members. Source: Eurostat 
 
 
The implicit tax rate on labour is generally around the EU average, therefore it is not obvious that 
high taxes cause low job creation. Still, one should keep in mind that most EEUMS aim to attract 
investors by offering low tax rates on capital and then compensate for smaller capital tax revenues 
by over-taxing consumption and especially labour. This can induce a bias towards capital-intensive 
investments which have a lesser impact on employment growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Ederveen, S. and L. Thissen (2007): Can Labour Market Institution Explain High Unemployment Rates in the New EU 
Member States? Empirica, 34, 299-317. 
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Figure 7. Implicit tax rates on labour in EU Member States, 2005 
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Note: the horizontal red line indicates the average of EU members. Source: Eurostat 
 
Furthermore, since some EEUMS (particularly in Central Europe) maintain costly welfare systems 
relative to their development level, there is little scope to reduce tax rates on labour. Cuts in public 
spending could still be the way forward. Indeed, Central and Eastern European countries with 
higher public spending have recently performed worse than other transition economies.27 Likewise, 
there is evidence that tighter fiscal policies are associated with more employment growth in the 
region, presumably because fiscal discipline strengthens the confidence of investors and public 
pay rises do not crowd out private employment.28 
The role of education 
Another set of explanations for low employment growth in the EEUMS concerns education. Chart 8 
indicates that the employment rate of those with at most primary education differ markedly from 
Western European levels, while the employment prospects of people with secondary or higher 
education are very similar in the two regions. If the share of low-skilled was as high in the EEUMS 
as in the EU15, this gap would imply an 8 percentage point lower employment rate. This turns out 
to explain the entire difference between the employment rates of the two regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Åslund, A. and N. Jenish (2007): The Eurasian Growth Paradox. In: Bourguignon, F. and Pleskovic, B. (eds.): Beyond 
Transition. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics – Regional, World Bank, Washington. 
28 Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) 
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Figure 8. Employment rates among the 15-64 years old in the EU by the highest level of 
education, 2007 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
What are the reasons for this? First, the low-skilled had lost employment disproportionately 
following transition. Second, the skills of these workers were highly firm- or process-specific and 
their ability to adapt and learn has remained limited.29 This is due to their lack of basic skills and 
competences. Köllő (2006) analysed results from the 1994-1998 in European countries. Adults in 
Central and Eastern Europe with only primary education performed worse in the 1994-1998 
International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) tests than their Western European counterparts. Also, 
the gap between the performance of younger and older adults with the same level of education 
was greater in central and Eastern Europe. In other words, low-skilled people educated in the 
socialist system are at a particular disadvantage in terms of skills and competences.30 
Third, job creation in the private sector was biased against low-skilled workers; more so, than in 
Western Europe. Although jobs in Central and Eastern Europe were less skill-intensive than in 
Western Europe, low-skilled workers were strongly discouraged from jobs requiring higher skills. 
Since their competences were deemed inadequate, candidates with higher education were chosen 
for these positions.31 Fourth, technological progress (the diffusion of ICT technology) has led to the 
substitution of low-skilled workers with machinery and skilled labour as the skill content of jobs 
rises. This implies that uneducated workers will continue to be squeezed out of the labour market. 
These findings point to the deficiency of education systems in some EEUMS. This is in some 
cases reflected for example in PISA test scores which measure the competences of 15 year-olds in 
reading, mathematics and science. Bulgaria and Romania are lagging far behind other EU 
members. Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia also fall below the EU average, which itself lags 
significantly global leaders (such as Finland). The poor state of vocational education is also to 
blame; it suffers from falling investments, poorly trained teachers and the decline of traditional 
industries. The curriculum of these schools often does not match market demand. While the 
industry-specific skills of graduates deteriorate quickly, not enough emphasis is placed on general 
competences and adaptability. Due to their deteriorating quality general secondary education is 
                                                 
29 Commander, S. and J. Köllő (2008): The Changing Demand for Skills: Evidence from Transition. Economics of 
Transition, 16 (2), 199-221. 
30 Köllő, J. (2006): Workplace Literacy Requirements and Unskilled Employment in East-Central and Western Europe: 
Evidence from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS). Budapest Working Papers of the Labour Market, BWP 
2006/7. 
31 Köllő (2006) 
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preferred, and only children with poorer skills are enrolled into vocational schools. This contributes 
to the further deterioration of these schools’ quality.32 
 
Figure 9. Average PISA scores of EU Member States, 2006 
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Note: score = average of reading, mathematics and science scores. The horizontal red line indicates the 
average of available EU members. Source: OECD 
 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
The EEUMS have lower employment rates than Western European counterparts. Moreover, they 
need faster economic growth to achieve the same rate of employment growth as the West. This 
poor performance is due to structural factors: in some cases inadequate incentives to work, and in 
most cases problems with basic and vocational education. Economic growth appears to be more 
biased against the low-skilled than in Western Europe. This suggests that jobless growth may 
remain a long-term problem in the EEUMS. There is no simple solution to this issue, but a number 
of policies can help: 
 
Although the long-term objective of EEUMS is the shift to a knowledge-based economy, this 
will be the task of future generations. A large share of working-age population lacks the 
skills for this transition and can only be employed in low-tech (hence low-wage) 
occupations. If wages converge to Western levels too fast, these jobs become endangered. 
Without working parents, children’s chances of receiving proper education and participating 
in the knowledge economy deteriorate. The desire to quickly reach Western living 
standards can thus contribute to more polarised societies. 
Disciplined fiscal and income policies help to build up the confidence of investors and can 
prevent industries employing low-skilled workers from being priced out of the market. 
Construction booms (a common phenomenon in the region) can raise employment in the 
short term, but they can give rise to dangerous macroeconomic imbalances. 
                                                 
32 Canning, M., M. Godfrey and D. Holzer-Zelazewska (2007): Vocational Education in the New EU Member States: 
Enhancing Labor Market Outcomes and Fiscal Efficiency. World Bank Working Paper No. 116. 
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Reforms to welfare and tax systems should enhance the incentives to work. Labour 
markets in the region are generally flexible enough, but social assistance can still become 
more targeted. Early retirement should not be encouraged to maintain the sustainability of 
pension systems. Tax incentives for capital income at the expense of labour need to be 
reconsidered since they can lead to the adoption of technologies with low labour intensity in 
countries where cheap labour is still the main comparative advantage. 
Education is the key to long-term growth and employment prospects. Since highly educated 
jobseekers face few difficulties in finding employment, policies should be targeted at 
children left behind in schools. Primary education should aim to provide sound basic 
competences to the widest possible range of population. Among others, vocational 
education needs to adapt to market needs; shift its focus to offer more general skills; and 
shed the stigma attached to blue-collar occupations. 
 
   
  
 
 
 
